Arbitration Law Review
Volume 4 Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation

7-1-2012

Arbitration and the Marcellus Shale
Zach Morahan

Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/arbitrationlawreview
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
Recommended Citation
Zach Morahan, Arbitration and the Marcellus Shale, 4 299 (2012).

This Student Submission - Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Arbitration Law Review by an authorized editor of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.

Article 33

A RBITRATION AND THE M ARCELLUS S HALE
Zach Morahan

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

The development of the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and some surrounding states
has presented many landowners with newfound wealth. But with the good often comes the bad,
and litigation surrounding the extraction is not uncommon. The governing document between the
landowner and the lessee is the lease. As such, it is important for each party to review the lease to
ensure the provisions are acceptable. But many landowners, particularly when the development
was in its infancy, did not have their leases reviewed by an attorney. And as a result, the leases
sometimes included clauses very unfavorable to the landowner. An arbitration clause, depending
on the specific details of the provision, can be the vehicle within which these unfavorable terms
may be couched.
This article explores the recent legislation and case law involving arbitration within the
Marcellus Shale Play. It then considers which laws apply to the arbitration agreement and
concludes with a discussion of relevant considerations for practitioners.
II.

THE COAL BED METHANE REVIEW BOARD

Practitioners should be aware of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1108, which was introduced by
Senators White, Wozniak, Scarnati, and Schwank, on June 6, 2011. 1 The introduced legislation
modifies Section 6.4(e) of the Coal Refuse Disposal Control Act and expands the authority of the
Coal Bed Methane Review Board. The amended section reads:
The purpose of the board shall be to consider objections and attempt to reach agreement
on or determine a location for the coal bed methane well or access road. The board shall also
have the authority to consider objections and reach agreement on or determine a location for
natural gas wells. 2
The bill further stated decisions of the board were subject to appeal to the “court of
common pleas in the county where the property at issue is located.” 3 The bill was referred to the
Environmental Resources and Energy Committee. In the past, the Review Board’s authority was
limited to coal bed methane wells and access roads. The proposed legislation grants the Review
Board authority to settle disputes on the location of natural gas wells. It is very important for
practitioners to follow this legislation because it may drastically affect the procedure for some
Marcellus disputes.
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III.

R E C E N T C A S E L A W D E VE L O P M E N T S

The Middle District of Pennsylvania recently heard a case involving an arbitration
agreement between a landowner and a lessee in Ulmer v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC. 4 Ulmer
petitioned the court to invalidate his lease, claiming it violated Pennsylvania’s Minimum royalty
statute. 5 Chesapeake moved to compel arbitration as stated in the parties’ agreement. At issue in
the case was whether the court would apply the Federal Arbitration Act or state law. 6 The court
noted the FAA applied to transactions involving interstate commerce.7 Ulmer’s property subject
to the oil and gas lease was located entirely within Pennsylvania and the court held the FAA did
not apply. 8
After determining that Pennsylvania law would apply, the court articulated a two-part
standard used to determine whether arbitration is appropriate. The first prong is whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate; once this prong is satisfied, a court must then determine whether the
arbitration agreement is applicable to the current dispute.9 After announcing the standard, the
court approached the second prong first. 10 The court found the arbitration provision covered the
current dispute. 11 It then addressed Ulmer’s argument that the lease, including the arbitration
provision, was void because it violated Pennsylvania’s minimum royalty act.12 The court noted
Ulmer was challenging the contract in its entirety. In reaching its decision, the court relied on
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna. 13 In Buckeye Check Cashing, the United States
Supreme Court held a challenge to the contract as a whole is a matter appropriate for the
arbitrator. 14 The court reconciled the decision in Buckeye Check Cashing with Pennsylvania law
by noting that the two are “functionally equivalent.” 15 In reaching its decision, the court stated:
Where a party challenges the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects
the entire agreement or on the ground that the illegality of one of the contract’s provisions renders
the whole contract invalid, the issue is to be considered by the arbitrator in the first instance. 16
Thus, because Ulmer challenged the legality of the entire contract, the Court held the
issue was appropriate for arbitration and granted Chesapeake’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. 17
Knowledge of this rule is essential for successful challenges to arbitration clauses. If
4
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practitioners seek to avoid arbitration, their challenge must specifically target the arbitration
agreement. Otherwise, any attack to the contract will be decided by an arbitrator.18
The District Court heard the same issue in Hayes v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC. 19
Once again, the landowner sought to invalidate the lease because it violated Pennsylvania’s
minimum royalty requirement. 20 Chesapeake moved to compel arbitration. 21 The defendants
argued that the arbitration clause covered the dispute and was appropriate for arbitration because
it was a “disagreement concerning the lease” as opposed to just the arbitration clause.22 The court
granted Chesapeake’s motion to compel and held that the dispute was appropriate for arbitration
based on the same reasoning employed in Ulmer. 23 Additionally, the Plaintiffs did not persuade
the court by arguing that real estate matters are statutorily prohibited from arbitration. 24
The Middle District of Pennsylvania once again heard a case involving an arbitration
agreement pertaining to a Marcellus Shale lease in Eisenberger v. Chesapeake Appalachia,
LLC. 25 This case concerned whether the parties actually entered into an agreement and, if so,
whether the arbitration clause governed their current dispute. The Plaintiffs owned land in
Wyoming County, Pennsylvania. 26 Premier Land Services, LLC (“Premier”) contacted the
Plaintiffs about signing an oil and gas lease.27 Following Premier’s original contact, the Plaintiffs
contacted Premier and expressed an interest in possibly signing a lease with Chesapeake. 28 As a
result, Premier provided the Plaintiffs with an unsigned lease which listed Mr. Eisenberger as a
single man and the only lessor. 29 After Mr. Eisenberger signed and returned the lease, Mrs.
Eisenberger noticed that the lease did not identify her as a co-owner of the land subject to the
lease. 30 As a result, Mr. Eisenberger mailed and faxed a letter to Premier requesting that it void
the current paperwork and send a new lease for review. 31 Premier later contacted Mr.
Eisenberger and told him Chesapeake’s legal department would handle the issue. 32
Approximately a week later, Premier contacted Mr. Eisenberger and stated Chesapeake thought
the lease was valid.33 Mr. Eisenberger subsequently notified Premier that he was revoking his
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offer. 34 The Plaintiffs then filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment stating the lease was
not an enforceable contract but simply represented an offer. 35 The case was removed to the
district court and Chesapeake moved to compel arbitration.36
The court articulated a two-part standard to determine whether parties must submit their
disputes to arbitration. It explained the dispute would be appropriate for arbitration if the
Plaintiffs entered into an agreement to arbitrate with Chesapeake and the current dispute fell
within the agreed-upon provision. 37 The first prong of the test, whether the parties entered into
an agreement to arbitrate, was at issue in this case. The court noted federal law usually preempts
state law on arbitral issues, and state law is typically applied in diversity cases. 38 It then
explained that, within diversity cases, courts should apply federal law in cases affecting interstate
commerce and state law in cases that do not.39 Because the lease in question concerned only land
within Pennsylvania, the court applied Pennsylvania law. 40
The court first turned to Buckeye Check Cashing and noted that challenges to the
arbitration clause exclusively are for the courts to decide and challenges to the contract generally
are appropriate for the arbitrator. 41 In Buckeye Check Cashing, Justice Scalia created an
exception to the general rule. In a footnote he stated: “The issue of the contract’s validity is
different from the issue whether any agreement between the alleged obligor and oblige was ever
concluded. Our opinion today addresses only the former.” 42 He later stated, “it is for courts to
decide whether the alleged obligor ever signed the contract,… whether the signor lacked authority
to commit the alleged principal,…and whether the signor lacked the mental capacity to assent.”43
The district court did not find the case analogous to Ulmer and Hayes; rather, it held the issue fit
within the area left unresolved in Buckeye Check Cashing. 44 As a result, the court found the
dispute between Eisenberger and Chesapeake was for the court, and not an arbitrator, to decide.45
Subsequent to the court’s decision, Chesapeake filed a Motion to Stay and a Renewed
Motion to Compel Arbitration.46 Chesapeake sought to stay the matter pending the decision in
Granite Rock v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters. 47 The court held there was no issue of contract
formation before the Supreme Court in Granite Rock; therefore, granting a stay was inappropriate
because the outcome of that case was unlikely to affect the current matter. 48 The court also
34
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denied the Renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration because Chesapeake did not introduce any
evidence for the court to change its position.49 This case creates a situation where practitioners
may sidestep the enforcement of an arbitration clause and a narrow exception for parties to gain
access to the courts. If Eisenberger challenged the legality of the contract, rather than whether a
contract was ever formed, it is likely the court would have ordered the matter to proceed to
arbitration. Eisenberger is a good example of why practitioners must be aware of the Buckeye
Check Cashing rule.
The future of the proposed legislation amending the Coal Bed Methane Review Board’s
authority over natural gas well sites may affect subsequent cases such as the aforementioned.
Although the proposed legislation is limited to disputes regarding natural gas well sites, no one
can be sure where the Board’s authority will eventually end. For example, must the well location
be at the heart of the dispute, or will any dispute somehow referencing a well location fall under
the authority of the Board?

IV.

STATE V. FEDERAL LAW: WHICH IS THE CORRECT LAW TO APP LY

Whether state or federal law will apply to a particular case is an important consideration
for the practitioners in that case. In some cases, the state and federal laws are very similar.50
Even though the laws are sometimes almost identical, the courts must determine which law is
applicable. The courts may apply the Federal Arbitration Act or the comparable state statute. 51
In Pennsylvania, the applicable state law is the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act. 52
Typically, state law is applied in diversity cases unless the matter involves interstate commerce,53
and the Ulmer decision articulated this position. 54 Because the property at issue was located
entirely within Pennsylvania, the court held Pennsylvania law applied. 55
Although the courts make clear Pennsylvania law applies in cases such as Ulmer,
practitioners representing clients near state borders must be aware of the possibility of the
application of the Federal Arbitration Act. Employing the logic used in Ulmer, it appears a
dispute involving property located in both Pennsylvania and a neighboring state, such as West
Virginia or New York, will apply the Federal Arbitration Act.
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V.

UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A CONTRACT DEFENSE VOIDING ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act states, “an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” 56 The Supreme Court articulated Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act evidences a strong policy towards the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 57 The
comparable Pennsylvania statute has a provision very similar to Section 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act. 58 Regardless of what statute applies, state contract law defenses may render
arbitration agreements invalid.59
One such defense, which may render Marcellus leases invalid, is an unconscionability
defense. 60 A contract is unconscionable when there is “a lack of meaningful choice in the
acceptance of the challenged provision and the provision unreasonably favors the party asserting
it.” 61 Procedural unconscionability is derived from the absence of the “meaningful choice” and
substantive unconscionability from the unreasonableness of the terms. 62 Both must be satisfied in
a successful challenge of the contract on an unconscionability ground and the party challenging
the provision shoulders the burden of proof. 63
The two-part test for the unconscionability test is particularly important for practitioners
handling Marcellus leases. For instance, if the lease is extremely unreasonable, but the lessor
makes a meaningful choice in agreeing to it, an unconscionability defense will fail. This situation
demonstrates the reason landowners should consult an attorney before signing a lease. The
attorney should review the lease to identify unfair provisions and attempt to remove them through
the negotiation process. At first glance, the gas company holds the higher ground in regards to
negotiation; however, landowner coalitions help to balance that inequality.
The distribution of arbitration costs provides practitioners with an argument to render an
agreement unconscionable. The arbitration provision in Ulmer read in part, “All fees and costs
associated with the arbitration shall be borne equally by the Lessor and Lessee.” 64 This
distribution of the costs creates an obstacle for the landowner in pursuing a remedy to an alleged
breach. The company essentially insulates itself from minor claims because it will not be worth it
for lessors to shoulder half the costs of arbitration in addition to their attorney fees to seek a
remedy. Even in more major disputes, the lessor’s expenses incurred through arbitration costs
may stop them from pursuing litigation. The distribution of arbitration costs may prove
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particularly burdensome to those with small amounts of leased acreage. Those with large
amounts of leased land will probably be able to afford the arbitration through their bonus
payment. Regardless, practitioners should attempt to negotiate the provision to put the costs on
the lessee. Additionally, it may be in the lessee’s interest to bear the full cost. If they do, they
take away any possibility of a lessor’s unconscionability claim based upon distribution of costs.
Practitioners should always discuss the effects of an arbitration agreement with their
client before the client agrees to a lease. An explanation of the differences between arbitration
and the courts is necessary because most landowners are not familiar with the arbitration
process. 65 If the arbitration agreement distributes the costs to the client, an explanation and
estimate of the additional costs is warranted so landowners can make an informed decision before
agreeing to the contract.

VI.

PRACTITIONER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS IN MARCELLUS SHALE LEASES

The most important action for a practitioner is a careful reading of the lease before the
client signs the lease. If the lease contains an arbitration clause, the practitioner should determine
who will arbitrate the dispute and how the arbitrators are selected. For instance, under
Pennsylvania’s Uniform Arbitration Act, if for some reason the parties fail to appoint an
arbitrator, or if the arbitrator is unable to perform his or her duty, the courts will appoint a
replacement. 66 To ensure the client will have an arbitrator they want, the agreement should
contain provisions for successor arbitrators. This eliminates the courts from appointing a
replacement and creates stability.
Another consideration practitioners must be aware of is the enforceability of the
arbitrator’s award. The Federal Arbitration Act limits the grounds for vacatur in Section 10. 67
Pennsylvania’s Uniform Arbitration Act has a provision similar to Section 10 of the Federal
Arbitration Act. 68 The grounds in both statutes are limited and narrow. Thus, practitioners must
inform their clients that the award will likely be final.
Practitioners should negotiate the lease before agreeing to a lease with an arbitration
clause. As the saying goes, “you cannot get what you do not ask for.” Thus, it never hurts to ask
the company to strike the arbitration clause. The company’s willingness to lease the property
without an arbitration clause can hinge on factors such as the size of the parcel, the location of the
parcel and the overall need of the parcel. For those landowners who do not possess particularly
large or attractive parcels there are different ways to negotiate. For example, to gain more
bargaining leverage, clients can join a landowner coalition as a form of collective bargaining.
Examination of the details of the arbitration clause is extremely important. For instance,
in Ulmer, the arbitration provision stated, “all such disputes shall be determined by arbitration in
accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.” 69 Practitioners cannot
assume the rules of the American Arbitration Association are similar to those they encounter in
court. Rather, they must carefully examine the rules to explain their implications to their clients.
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In a situation where the arbitration provision mandates the use of the American
Arbitration Association rules, the arbitrator must determine whether the Commercial Rules or
Expedited Rules will apply. R-1(b) of the Commercial Rules states, “Unless the parties or the
AAA determines otherwise, the Expedited Procedures shall apply in any case in which no
disclosed claim or counterclaim exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and arbitration fees and
costs.” 70 This is significant because under the Expedited Rules, the arbitration can last only one
day. 71 This provision merits explanation to the landowner so they understand the differences
between arbitration and the court. Additionally, the benefits and consequences of the Expedited
Rules should be explained. For instance, the Expedited Rules are beneficial because the dispute
will be resolved quickly and at a lower cost. However, the consequence is the lack of time a
party has to introduce evidence and present their case. If parties prefer the Expedited Rules, they
may contract to them in their arbitration provision. However, they should be aware of potential
disputes where the time crunch of the Expedited Rules is harmful.
A practitioner must also determine how the arbitrators are selected. In Ulmer’s lease, the
arbitration provision failed to state how many arbitrators would hear the dispute. 72 Under the
Commercial Arbitration Rules, when an agreement is silent on the number of arbitrators, “the
dispute shall be heard and determined by one arbitrator, unless the AAA, in its discretion, directs
that three arbitrators be appointed.” 73 This creates a level of uncertainty for the landowner. If a
practitioner encounters a provision which fails to state the amount of arbitrators, they should
negotiate the lease to specify how many and how the arbitrators are selected.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The Marcellus Shale presents exciting new economic opportunities for Pennsylvania and
some of the surrounding states. As exciting as the play can be, it is important for landowners and
attorneys to review leases to protect their interests. Although arbitration has advantages,
landowners must be cautious when signing leases containing arbitration clauses and practitioners
must be proactive in explaining the pros and cons of arbitration to their clients. Failure to do so
may end in a malpractice action.
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